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I. INTRODUCTION
It took Steve Millet ten years to discover that his identity
had been stolen.' During that time, the thief managed to obtain a
dozen credit cards, buy a car, and even purchase a house using the
stolen number and his own name.2 "You can't find out except by
accident," Millet's wife, Melody, said "They are not required to
notify us. No one is required to notify you. The way it sits now,
our lives [are] ruined.4  We will never have again a normal
financial life." 5
Millet is now suing the credit reporting agencies for the
manner in which they handled his identity theft . Interestingly,
Millet applied for a credit card during those ten years and his
application was denied.7 If the credit company with whom Millet
applied had denied him because of the information in his credit
report, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) entitled Millet to
receive a notice from the company informing him of the adverse
action taken against him. Therefore, Millet might have a cause of
action against the credit company, as well. 9
Until very recently, companies that used consumer credit
reports were unclear as to when and under what circumstances an







7. Sullivan, supra note 1.
8. See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 615, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m(a) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2007).
9. See generally § 1681n-o (providing a private right of action for consumers
against anyone who fails to comply with the provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act).
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adverse action notice was required.10 Further, consumers who
failed to receive these notices did not have a clear understanding
of when a company violated the FCRA.11 The Supreme Court case
of Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr12 helped to clarify some
of these ambiguities as they relate to insurance companies and
consumers." The decision, however, stops short of completely
resolving every ambiguity of the FCRA, making the possibility of
future litigation a near certainty. 4
Part II of this Comment will describe the world of credit
reports, including credit reporting agencies, the use of credit
reports by the insurance industry, and the FCRA." Part III of this
Comment will detail the recent Burr case, mentioned above, andS 16
explain the important facets of its holdings. Part IV will explain
the effects of those holdings on consumers and the insurance
industry, with a particular emphasis on consumer protection risks
and the likelihood of future litigation."
II. THE WORLD OF CREDIT REPORTS
A. Consumer Credit Reports
A consumer credit report is any communication of
information by a consumer reporting agency" regarding a
10. See John K. DiMugno & Michael Sean Quinn, Safeco Insurance Company v.
Burr: The United States Supreme Court Creates New Guidelines for the Use of Credit
Reports in Underwriting, 29 No. 12 INS. LITIG. REP. 453 (2007).
11. Charlotte M. Bahin, Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr - FCRA
Lessons for Banks, BANKING L. COMMITTEE J. (ABA Section of Bus. Law Comm. on
Banking Law, Chicago, I11.), July 2007, http://www.abanet.orgIbuslaw/committeees/C
L130000pub/newsletter/200708/bahin.pdf.
12. 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
13. Id. at 2208-18.
14. Ernest T. Patrikis & Glen Cuccinello, Safeco-U.S. Supreme Court Applies
Fair Credit Reporting Statute in a Commercially Reasonable Manner, CLIENT ALERT:




15. See infra notes 18-121 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 122-62 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 163-282 and accompanying text.
18. InvestorWords.com, http://www.investorwords.com/1063/consumer-reporting
agency.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2008). A credit reporting agency "collects and sells
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consumer's "credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of
living."19 The information in the credit report is used to establish
the consumer's eligibility for credit, insurance, employment, or
20other purposes.
Credit reports are integral in credit scoring.21 Credit scoring
is the system that creditors use to help determine whether to
extend credit to a consumer and to determine the rate that the
consumer will pay for the insurance or loan.2 Information about a
consumer's credit experiences, such as "bill-paying history," "the
number and type of accounts" a consumer has, timely payment of
bills, any "outstanding debts," and whether there are any
collection actions out against the consumer are gleaned from the
23
credit report. Creditors then use a statistical program to calculate
a credit score, which determines the "creditworth[iness]" of the
consumer.24  In other words, the credit score determines the
likelihood that a consumer will "repay a loan" and make timely
25payments.
information about the creditworthiness of individuals." Id. Consumer reporting
agencies are authorized by Congress to disclose consumer information to certain
public and private entities. See Brief for Mortgage Insurance Companies of America
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs.
Group, 435 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 06- 82, 84, 100, 101), 2006 WL 3309503, at
*6 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b) [hereinafter Mortgage Insurance Companies of
America]. The major databases of consumer reporting, known as the Big Three, are
Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union. See The Truth Behind Insurance Credit
Scoring, http://insurancescored.com/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2008); Brief for The National
Consumer Law Center, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007) (No. 06-84, 100), 2006 WL 3747726, at
*8 [hereinafter National Consumer Law Center]. The credit reporting industry has
expanded since World War II. See National Consumer Law Center, at *8. Only 13
years ago the consumer reporting industry maintained credit files on 110 individuals.
See id. Now, databases of consumer reporting agencies have information on the
"personal financial habits of 200 million persons," the majority of adults in the
country. See id.
19. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603d, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).
20. Id.
21. See Federal Trade Commission-Facts for Consumers, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp
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Insurance companies use credit reports and credit scores to
help predict the likelihood that a consumer will file an insurance
claim, commit insurance fraud, or commit arson.26 Insurance
companies might consider a consumer's credit report and credit
score when deciding "whether to grant [the consumer] insurance
and the amount of the premium" to be charged.2 The credit
scores used by insurance companies are also known as "insurance
scores" or "credit-based insurance scores."
'
B. Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act 29 is a federal law that
regulates the collection, distribution, and use of consumer credit
information. ° Enacted in 1970, the purpose of the FCRA is to
ensure the accuracy and fairness of credit reporting, "promote
efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.""
The FCRA states that "any person [who] takes any adverse action
with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on
any information contained in a consumer report" must notify the
affected consumer." As it applies to insurance companies, an
"adverse action" is a "denial or cancellation of coverage," an
"increase in any charge," or any "reduction or other adverse or
unfavorable change in . . . coverage or the amount of .
insurance."
3
The adverse action notice must tell the consumer that an
adverse action has been taken against him and what that adverse
26. The Truth Behind Insurance Credit Scoring, supra note 18; Facts for
Consumers, supra note 21.
27. Facts for Consumers, supra note 21. Insurance companies use the term
"claims consciousness" to describe their rationale for this policy. The Truth Behind
Insurance Credit Scoring, supra note 18. "Claims Consciousness" means that a
person with the good credit score is "more likely to settle the accident without the
insurance company, the person who scored poorly is more inclined to file a claim and
expect to be compensated for the loss." Id.
28. Id.
29. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).
30. See Joint Brief of Respondents, Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct.
2201 (2007) (No. 06-84, 100), 2006 WL 3760845, at *2.
31. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2205 (2007); § 1681(a).
32. § 1681m(a) (emphasis added).
33. § 1681a(k)(1)(b)(i).
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action is.34 The notice must also provide the name, address, and
phone number of the consumer reporting agency furnishing the
credit report so the consumer can dispute the report.3" Finally, the
notice must tell the consumer how he can get a free copy of his
credit report.36 The FCRA prescribes other requirements for the
adverse action notice.3"
The FCRA also provides a private right of action against
businesses that use consumer credit reports but fail to comply with
the notice requirements.38 A negligent violation of the adverse
action notice requirement entitles the consumer to actual
damages.39 If the violation is willful, however, the consumer may
be entitled to actual damages, statutory damages ranging from
$100 to $1,000, and even punitive damages.40 To properly request
relief in the form of these damages, the plaintiff must have a clearS • 41
understanding of what constitutes a violation. Similarly,
insurance companies must also have a clear understanding of the
FCRA's provisions in order to avoid liability for actual, statutory,
and punitive damages. 2 The issue of when an adverse action
notice is required, however, was a very murky issue until the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Safeco
Insurance Co of America v. Burr.3
How the FCRA applied to the insurance industry, before
Burr, was an issue that was "far from transparent."44 Conflicts had
34. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2201.
35. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 8.2.6.1 (6 h ed.
2006) (citing § 1681a(k)(1)(b)(i)).
36. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2201.





41. See Dianne E. Rist, & S. Todd Sipe, Supreme Court's Important Safeco
Decision Clarifies Standard for a Willful Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
ANDREWS' BANK & LENDER LIAB. LITIG. REP., Sept. 17, 2007, at 1, available at 13
No. 9 ANBLLLR 13.
42. See, e.g., Brief for Financial Services Roundtable et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007) (No.
06-84, 100) 2006 WL 3350577, at *20 [hereinafter Financial Services Roundtable];
DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
43. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2208-18 (2007).
44. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
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arisen in the circuit courts over the various provisions of the
FCRA.4' For example, circuits treated certain provisions, such as
what conduct by an insurance company constitutes a willful
violation, differently. 46 Ambiguities in the FCRA included (1) the
meaning of the word "increase," (2) whether reliance on a credit
report is a necessary condition for the notice, and (3) what
constitutes a willful violation of the FCRA.47
1. "Increase"
An adverse action is defined as "an increase in any charge
for ... any insurance, existing or applied for." 8 There are several
ambiguities regarding the term "increase." First, does the FCRA's
adverse action notice requirement apply to an initial rate charged
to a new customer, or "is it limited to an increase in a rate that the
consumer has previously been charged?,
49
Insurance companies construed the word "increase" very
narrowly and argued that initial rates for a new insurance policy
were not included in this provision.0 Initial rates offered to first-
time customers, they argued, cannot be an "increase" because
there was "no prior dealing" between the consumer and the
company.51 The statutory phrase "increase in any charge for ...
insurance,52 implies a change in treatment.53 Therefore, insurance
companies asserted that there must be a previous charge for
comparison. 4
Consumers, on the other hand, argued that "increase"
included a first-time rate.5   For instance, suppose a gas station
45. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
46. See id.
47. See infra notes 48-81 and accompanying text.
48. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603, § 1681a(k)(1)(B)(i) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).
49. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir.
2006).
50. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2210 (2007).
51. Id.
52. § 1681a(k)(1)(b)(i).
53. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 2211.
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owner charges a customer that he does not like a higher price for
gas than the price posted outside of the gas station. 6 Although this
is the first time the gas station owner has dealt with the consumer,
57the owner is still charging the consumer an increased price.
Because the owner increased the price despite the absence of prior
dealing of the two parties, the consumers analogize this to initial
insurance rates. 58
Another issue is which benchmark or baseline rate is
appropriate for determining whether a first-time rate is an
increase. 9 Consumers argued that the baseline rate for com-
parison should be "the rate that the applicant would have received
with the best possible credit score." 6 This reading was arguably
more consistent with the purpose of the FCRA's notice
requirements.61
Insurance companies, on the other hand, contended that a
consumer's rate has not been "increased" simply because he would
have received a lower rate if he had a better credit score.62
Instead, the baseline score is "what the applicant would have had
if the company had not taken his credit score into account., 63 This
rate is termed the "neutral score rate." 64
The final issue regarding the "increase" provision is that of
policy renewals.65 It was unclear if the same baseline was to apply




59. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2007).
60. Id.; see Brief for United States Government as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007) (No. 06-84, 100),
2006 WL 3336481, at *26 [hereinafter United States Government].
61. See Brief for State of Oregon et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007) (No. 06-84, 100), 2006 WL
3747725, at *5 ("Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act to protect
consumers from flaws in the credit reporting system and to improve the integrity and
reliability of credit reports.").
62. See Reply Brief of Petitioners, Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201
(2007) (No. 06-100), 2007 WL 62295, at *3.
63. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2213.
64. Id.
65. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
66. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2214.
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not, was an adverse action notice required at each renewal date?6 7
Once a consumer had learned that his credit report led the insurer
to charge more, and his rate had not changed, it was unclear
whether he needed to be given notice with each renewal.68
2. "Based in Whole or in Part"
Notice of an adverse action is only required when the
adverse action is "based in whole or in part" on a credit report. 9
Before Burr, it was uncertain if this provision meant that notice
was required if the credit report was merely consulted, or if notice
was only required if the increase would not have occurred but for
the consulting of the credit report.7 ° Insurers argued that "in order
to have adverse action 'based on' a credit report, consideration of
the report must be a necessary condition for the increased rate.",
71
The statutory language "in part, '7 2 however, suggested that the
statute could mean that an adverse action is "based on" a credit
report whenever the report was "considered in the rate-setting
process."73 If this interpretation was correct, simply consulting the
report would require an adverse action notice. 4
3. "Willful"
The FCRA allows a consumer to recover statutory
damages and punitive damages if an insurer "willfully fail[s] to
comply" with the Act.75 The issue regarding this provision was
whether "willful" encompassed intentional violations, or included
the lesser mental state of reckless.6 Insurers argued that only
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 615, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).
70. See DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
71. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2212.
72. § 1681 m(a).
73. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2212.
74. Id.
75. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 616, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).
76. See Brief for National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201
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willful violations of the statute justified such damages.77
Construing the statute to include reckless violations placed an
"excessive and potentially crushing burden of liability on users and
providers of credit information," increasing their susceptibility to
litigation."'
Consumers, however, looked at the term "willful" in other
statutory contexts and argued that "willful" includes a "conscious
disregard of the law."79 Further, the civil construction of "willful"
can be distinguished from the criminal construction.0 Because this
was a civil matter, consumers argued that a willful violation was
one that was in reckless disregard of the FCRA.81
C. Insurance Industry
Prescreened offers are frequently used by companies
offering to sell insurance policies to consumers. 82 These offers
inform consumers that they have been prequalified for an
insurance rate or product.83  Prescreened offers are sometimes
called "preapproved" offers and are based on information in a
consumer's credit report indicating that he met certain criteria.
These solicitations usually reach the consumer by mail, but can
also be received by phone or in an email.'
Insurance companies are able to make prescreened offers
because of the ability of consumer reporting agencies to "disclose
consumer information to various public and private entities.
''
8
This information has enabled "credit grantors and others to make
more expeditious and accurate decisions, to the benefit of
(2007) (No. 06-84, 100), 2006 WL 3350574, at *5.
77. Joint Brief of Respondents, supra note 30, at *17.
78. Id.
79. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 435 F.3d 1081, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006).
80. See id. (stating that in criminal cases, actual knowledge of illegality is required
for a willful violation of a criminal statute).
81. See id.




86. See Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, supra note 18, at *6.
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consumers."' 7  Consumers have saved as much as $100 billion
annually because of this information." Approximately fifty-one
percent of auto insurance companies use credit scoring to set
policy discounts, according to one Michigan survey.89
Prescreened offers are subject to the FCRA's adverse
action notice requirement. 90 If the company offering a consumer
the preapproved offer takes adverse action against a consumer, it
must provide the consumer with notice.9' As a result of such
widespread use of prescreened offers, "insurers have devised
strategies to circumvent the FCRA's notice requirements."
92
Otherwise, insurance companies would have to send large volumes
of adverse action notices to consumers. 93 Such strategies include
"challenging the applicability of the FCRA to the initial sale of
insurance" and "attempting to 'neutralize' the effect of an
applicant's credit score., 94 The strategies of GEICO and Safeco,
the two entities involved in the Burr litigation, illustrate these
approaches.9
The ambiguities in the FCRA, combined with the
contentious strategies of the insurance industry, have resulted in
litigation.96 As of June 2007, prescreened offers were the subject
of 253 federal lawsuits. 97  Consumers alleged that once they
applied for the policy, the insurance or credit company increased
the initial terms of the offer.98 The reason for the change was the
87. Id. at *15 (citing FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER
SEC.318 AND 319 OF THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003,
at 1 (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/12/factarpt.shtm).
88. See Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, supra note 18, at *15 (citing
H. REP. No. 108-263, at 23 (2003)).
89. FRANK M. FITZGERALD, THE USE OF INSURANCE CREDIT SCORING IN
AUTOMOBILE AND HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 9 (2002), http://www.michigan.gov/doc
uments/cis_ofis_creditscoring-report_52885_7.pdf.
90. See In re Citifinancial Servs. Prescreened Offer Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1359,
1360 (J.P.M.L. 2007).
91. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 615, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).




96. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
97. See Cheyenne Hopkins, High Court's FCRA Ruling Could Ease Suit Threat,
AM. BANKER, June 12, 2007.
98. See id.
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consumer's specific credit history.99 Consumers alleged a violation
of the FCRA because they did not receive adverse action notices
once their initial rates were increased." °
D. The Road to the Supreme Court
Prior to the Supreme Court granting certiorari in the Burr
case, the federal courts of appeals were divided on the meanings of
the provisions of the FCRA, especially the "willful fail[ure] to
comply" section. 1' The Seventh and Eighth Circuits, for example,
had ruled that the adverse action notice requirement only applied
where the company was "'conscious' that its actions had impinged
on consumer's rights under the FCRA."' 0' The Third and Ninth
Circuits, on the other hand, held that notice was required only in
circumstances where an entity "may not have been intentionally
violating the statute, but acted in reckless disregard of consumers'
rights."'0 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this
conflict in "the circuits on an issue of crucial importance to all
entities, including lenders facing actions, especially class actions,
for purported violations of the FCRA."' 4
Two cases in the Ninth Circuit raised these issues and were
consolidated for review by the Supreme Court.' 5 In one case,
Ajene Edo filed suit against GEICO General Insurance Company
(GEICO) for violating the adverse action notice requirement. 6
Edo argued that he applied for auto insurance with GEICO and,
once GEICO obtained Edo's credit score, he was offered a
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 616, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).
102. Rist & Sipe, supra note 41 (citing Wantz v. Experian Info. Solutions, 386 F.3d
829, 835 (7" Cir. 2004) and Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 368 (8"' Cir. 2002)).
103. Rist & Sipe, supra note 41 (citing Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d
220, 227 (3rd Cir. 1997) and Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 435 F.3d 1081,
1093 (9th Cir. 2006)).
104. Rist & Sipe, supra note 41.
105. See Reynolds, 435 F.3d at 1093; Spano v. Safeco Corp., 140 Fed. Appx. 746,
747 (2005).
106. See Rausch v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., No. 01-1529-BR, 2003 WL
22722061, at*1-2. (D.Or. Jul. 31, 2003); Reynolds, 435 F.3d at 1093.
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standard policy. 1°7 Edo claimed that because GEICO did not offer
Edo the "most favorable" rate and did not provide Edo with an
adverse action notice, GEICO was in violation of the FCRA.'
8
Edo claimed no "actual harm, but sought statutory and punitive
damages under the FCRA."' '° The district court for the District of
Oregon granted summary judgment for GEICO, finding that
GEICO did not take adverse action against Edo because the rate
that Edo was charged "'would have been the same even if GEICO
Indemnity did not consider information in [his] consumer credit
history."' 110
In the second case, Charles Burr and Shannon Massey filed
suit against Safeco Insurance Company of America (Safeco) for a
violation of the adverse action notice requirement."' Burr and
Massey were offered higher insurance premium rates than the
"best rates possible" and were not sent adverse action notices.1
Burr and Massey alleged a willful violation of the FCRA's notice
requirement and sought statutory and punitive damages under theS113
adverse action notice requirement. The district court for the
District of Oregon granted summary judgment for Safeco, holding
that a single, initial rate for insurance could not constitute an
adverse action.'
14
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed both
107. See Spano, 140 Fed. Appx. at 747. GEICO provided auto insurance through
four subsidiaries: "GEICO General, which sold 'preferred' policies at low rates to
low-risk customers; Government Employees, which also sells 'preferred' policies, but
only to government employees, GEICO Indemnity, which sells standard policies to
moderate-risk customers; and GEICO Casualty, which sells nonstandard policies at
higher rates to high-risk customers." Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201,
2207 (2007). An agent takes a potential customer's information and obtains his credit
score. See id. The information is processed by the GEICO computer, which selects
the appropriate GEICO subsidiary and the particular rate of the policy to be issued.
See id. Petitioner Edo received a standard policy from GEICO Indemnity. See id.
108. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2207.
109. Id. (citing Fair Credit Reporting Act § 616, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n(a) (West
2000 & Supp. 2007)).
110. Id. (citing Edo v. GEICO Casualty Co., CV 02-678-BR, 2004 WL 3639689, *4
(D.Or., Feb. 23, 2004)).
111. See Spano v. Safeco Corp., 140 Fed. Appx. 746 (2005).
112. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2207.
113. See id.; Fair Credit Reporting Act § 616, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n(a) (West 2000
& Supp. 2007).
114. See Spano v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 215 F.R.D. 601 (D.Or. 2003).
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judgments."' In GEICO, the court held that whenever a
''consumer would have received a lower rate for his insurance had
the information in his consumer report been more favorable, an
adverse action has been taken against him., 1 6 In Safeco, the court
rejected the reasoning that an initial rate was not an adverse
action."7 Further, the Ninth Circuit held that "willfully fail[ing] to
comply"'' 8 with the FCRA includes a reckless disregard of a
consumer's rights." 9 The Supreme Court consolidated the two
matters and granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the circuit
courts.2  The U.S. Government supported the consumers as
amicus curiae."'
III. EXPLANATION OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion 12  in Burr
clarified several ambiguities in the FCRA.123 The most important
holdings were that (1) there is no prior dealing requirement to
have an increase in rates, 24 (2) the rate offered to trigger the
adverse action requirement is an increase in regards to what the
applicant would have been charged if the company had not taken
115. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2207.
116. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir.
2006).
117. See Spano v. Safeco Corp., 140 Fed. Appx. 746 (2005).
118. 1681n(a).
119. See Reynolds, 435 F.3d at 1099.
120. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2208.
121. See United States Government, supra note 60.
122. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2217-18. There were two concurring opinions in the
case. See id. One was written by Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined.
See id. at 2217. Stevens disagreed with the majority's decision that "based in whole
or in part" meant that consulting a credit report was a necessary condition for the
adverse action. Id at 2217. Stevens thought that reviewing a report should only be a
sufficient condition. See id. at 2217-18. Also, Stevens worried that the neutral score
adopted by the majority would permit insurance companies to use the credit score of
a below-average consumer as the "neutral" score. Id. at 2217. The second
concurring opinion was written by Justice Thomas and was joined by Justice Alito.
See id. at 2217-18. Thomas disagreed with the Court's resolution that the term
"increase" meant that "no prior dealing" is required. See id. This issue, he said, was
not "necessary to the court's conclusion and not briefed or argued by the parties."
Id. at 2218.
123. See DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
124. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
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his credit score into account,'25 (3) no notice is required for the
renewal applicant,2 6 (4) a credit report is a necessary condition for
an increase in rates,'127 and (5) "willful" is a broader standard than
"knowing," and encompasses recklessness.
A. Establishing an "Increase"
1. No prior dealing requirement
The Court accepted the Government's argument that
"increase" includes a first-time rate, holding that this definition
was a "better fit" than determining an increase from a previous
rate.9 An increase requires no prior dealing.13 Therefore, an
adverse action notice was required for "initial rates for new
applicants."''
2. Benchmark
If the customer is a first-time customer, the Court held that
insurance companies are permitted to use the "neutral rate test" to
determine the baseline score.32 GEICO had the "better position"
on this issue because it was likely that Congress, when proposing
the FCRA, was "more ... concerned with the practical question
whether the consumer's rate actually suffered when the company
took his credit report into account than ... whether the consumer
would have gotten a better rate with perfect credit.'
133
The Court recognized that this reading of the statute leaves
a loophole.'14 For example, a first-time applicant might have a
125. See id. at 2213.
126. See id. at 2214.
127. Id. at 2212.
128. Id. at 2205.
129. See id. at 2211.
130. See Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 435 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.
2006).
131. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 (2007).
132. Id. at 2213.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2213-14.
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credit report that contains an error.135 Even with this error, the
applicant might still have a "better-than-neutral" credit score.136
Because of this "better-than-neutral" credit score, the applicant
would not receive an adverse action notice.137
The Court reasoned that because it is unknown how often
these cases will occur, a more "demonstrable and serious
disadvantage" would occur if they adhered to the consumers' and
the Government's position.13 This disadvantage would occur
through excessive notifications or "hypernotification,"'3 9 as the
consumers' view would require insurers to send "slews of adverse
action notices" and would undercut the "obvious policy" behind
the notice requirement. 4 The Court, however, did not offer any
legal support for this view.'
3. Renewals
The Court held that if the consumer is an existing
customer, the baseline rate at the time of renewal would be the
prior rate given to the customer.42 The prior rate replaces the
neutral rate as the baseline.' 3 As long as the renewal rate is not
higher than the previous rate given to the customer, an adverse
action notice is not required.'" Thus, once a consumer has learned
that his credit report led the insurer to increase his rates, he does
not need to be given subsequent adverse action notices as long as
his rates are not subsequently increased. 45
135. See id. at 2213.
136. Id.
137. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2213 (2007).
138. Id. at 2214.
139. Id.
140. Id. (stating that the "obvious policy" was to notify the consumer that his rates
suffered when the company took his credit report into account).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2214 (2007).
144. See id.
145. See Nancy C. Dreher, Supreme Court Holds that Reckless Conduct Suffices as
"Willful" Under the FCRA and Further Holds that Initial Rates Charged for New
Insurance Policies can Constitute "Adverse Actions", BANKR. SERVICE CURRENT
AWARENESS ALERT, Aug. 2007, at 7, available at 2007 NO. 8 BSV-BCA 7
[hereinafter Reckless Conduct].
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B. Credit Report a Necessary Condition
The Court held that consideration of the credit report is a
"necessary condition" for the increased rate.146 Based on the
purpose and history of the FCRA, § 1681m(a) does not require
giving notice if the company merely consults the report. 47 "If [a
consumer's] credit report has no identifiable effect on the rate,"
the Court stated, there is no "immediately practical reason [for the
consumer] to worry about it."' 48 Therefore, "it makes more sense"
to require that consideration of the report be a necessary condition
of the adverse action notice.149 "To the extent there is any
disagreement on this issue," the Court said that it would accept
GEICO's reading that reviewing the credit report must cause the
adverse action notice." °
C. Defining a Willful Violation
The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of what
conduct constitutes willful failure to comply with the FCRA.5'
GEICO and Safeco argued that "willfully fail[ing] to comply'
52
with the FCRA only applies to knowingly violating the FCRA.
5 3
The Court disagreed, and held that the "the standard civil usage"
of the word "willful" includes "reckless FCRA violations.', 5 4 Thus,
a company is not in violation of the FCRA unless it acted in
reckless disregard of its provisions.'55  The Court defined
146. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2212.
147. See id. ("The originally enacted version of the notice requirement stated:
'Whenever ...the charge for ...insurance is increased either wholly or partly
because of information contained in a consumer report. . . , the user of the consumer
report shall so advise the consumer.... .' Id. (citing Fair Credit Reporting Act § 615,
15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1976 ed.)). "The 'because of' language in the original statute
emphasized that the consumer report must actually have caused the adverse action
for the notice requirement to apply." Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2212. When amending the
FCRA in 1996, Congress wanted to define "adverse action" more specifically and
therefore decided to "split" the adverse action notice provision into two separate
subsections. Id. "In the revised version of § 1681m(a), the original 'because of'
phrasing changed to 'based on,' but there was no indication that this change was
meant to be a substantive alteration of the statute's scope." Id.)
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recklessness as "a risk of violating the law substantially greater
than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless."'56
D. Holding of Burr
The Court used these clarifications to arrive at its
holding. 57 In the GEICO matter, the Court held that because the
initial rate offered to Edo was one that he "would have received
[had] his credit score not been taken into account," GEICO did
not owe him an adverse action notice. In the Safeco matter, the
Court found that although Safeco mistakenly thought that §
1681m(a) did not apply to initial applications, it was "clear
enough" that the company's conduct was not reckless.5 9 The
Court acknowledged the ambiguity of the statute, stating that:
[b]efore these cases, no court of appeals had spoken
on the issue, and no authoritative guidance has yet
come from the FTC . . . . Given this dearth of
guidance . . .Safeco's reading was not objectively
unreasonable, and so falls well short of raising the
"unjustifiably high risk" of violating the statute
necessary for reckless liability. 6°
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals finding that a
reckless disregard of the adverse action notice requirement would
qualify as a willful violation within the meaning of the adverse
action notice requirement of the FCRA.16' The Court reversed the
judgments of the Ninth Circuit in both cases, however, because
151. See id. at 2208-10.
152. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).
153. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2208.
154. Id. at 2209 (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 2215.
156. Id.
157. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
158. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2214.
159. Id. at 2215.
160. Id. at 2216.
161. See id. at 2215.
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GEICO did not owe Edo an adverse action notice and Safeco's
misreading of the statute was not reckless."'
IV. EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
The Burr holding produced interesting and complicated
effects on the parties involved.163 Consumer advocates called the
holding an "incomplete victory."' 64  Justice Stevens, in his
concurring opinion, was not so optimistic and warned of the
potential negative effects on consumers.'65
A. "Increase"
Insurance companies may benefit from certain aspects of
the Burr holding. The "neutral rate test" adopted by the Court is
more favorable to insurance companies, requiring them to send
out fewer adverse action notices than if they were required to
apply the "best possible rate" test.'66 The latter would have
required companies to send an adverse action notice if the
increased rate was higher than the rate the applicant would have
received if he had the "best possible credit score."
167
Consequently, insurance companies would have been required to
send "slews" of adverse action notices. 68
Furthermore, the Burr opinion does not require insurance
companies to use the "median consumer credit score.', 169 Instead,
the baseline score that insurance companies must apply is merely
the credit score the applicant would have had if his credit score
162. See id. at 2216.
163. Hopkins, supra note 97 (noting that the Burr decision could save banks and
other companies millions of dollars): see generally Patrikis & Cuccinello, supra note
14 (stating that the holding of Burr will be particularly interesting to counsel for
insurance companies).
164. Deepak Gupta, Supreme Court Decides Fair Credit Reporting Act Cases,
CONSUMER L. & POL'Y BLOG, June 4, 2007, http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/20
07/06/supreme-courtd.htnl.
165. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2217-18 (2007) (stating
that the majority's holding "disserves... consumers").
166. See Reckless Conduct, supra note 145.
167. Id.
168. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2214.
169. Id. at 2217 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the "score need not (and
probably will not) reflect the median consumer credit score").
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had not been considered by the insurance company.170 Therefore,
the likely result is that insurance companies will "adopt whatever
'neutral' scores they want,''. and use "the creditworthiness of a
run-of-the-mill applicant who lacks a credit report" as the neutral
rate.' Obviously, this score will be lower than the median
consumer score.'73 Because this "run-of-the-mill" baseline credit
score will inevitably be subject to high insurance rates, it is less
likely that the applicant's rate will be higher than this baseline
rate.74 Thus, the adverse action notice requirement will not be
triggered and insurance companies will not be required to send out
nearly as many adverse action notices than if they had used the
median consumer credit score.17
Further, insurance companies will not need to send adverse
action notices for renewal policies. The Court addressed the
renewal issue as a matter of practicality, stating that
hypernotification would thwart Congress' intention of making sure
consumers know the accuracy of their credit reports.77  Justice
Souter explained that once a consumer knows that his credit
report caused the insurance company to charge him a rate that is
higher than the initial rate offered, there is no reason for the
consumer to be "told that over again with each renewal" that his
rate has increased. The baseline rate now becomes the rate that
was previously charged to the consumer and not the neutral
baseline. 9 Therefore, after an "initial dealing" between the
170. See id. at 2214 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 2217 (Stevens, J., concurring).
172. Id.
173. See id; see also supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
174. See DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
175. See id.
176. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2214 (2007). The Court posed
the following question: "did Congress intend the same baseline to apply if the quoted
rate remains the same over a course of dealing, being repeated at each renewal
date?" Id. As one critic put it: "given the Court's concerns about hypernotification,
it not surprisingly answered [the renewal question] with an emphatic 'no."' DiMugno
& Quinn, supra note 10.
177. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2214.
178. Id.
179. See id. (referencing the gas station metaphor again. "Once the gas station
owner had charged the customer the above-market price," the Court reasoned, "it
would be strange to speak of the same price as an increase every time the customer
pulled in.")
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company and the consumer, in order for an increase to trigger the
notice requirement, it must be an increase over the previous rate
charged to the consumer.1'8  Insurance companies can avoid
sending adverse action notices by simply not raising an existing
customer's rate with each renewal term.181
One example of the renewal strategy is a consumer who
initially had a perfect credit score and obtained the best insurance
rate.1 2 When the consumer renewed his policy, he was charged a
higher rate because his credit score had fallen during the interim.
183
The new rate was still lower, though, than the rate he would have
received had his credit report not been taking into account.' 84 An
insurance company would not need to send an adverse action
notice to this customer."'
B. "Based in Whole or in Part"
The Burr holding indicated that insurance companies can
continue to employ the multi-factor system.' 86 The based on
requirement'8 of the adverse action provision was ambiguous until
the Burr opinion, which clarified that the term meant that
"consideration of the report," must have been a "necessary
condition" for the adverse action.'8 The necessary condition
requirement provides a possible avenue for insurance companies
to circumvent the FCRA's notice requirement by allowing them to
consider several facts about a consumer, including his credit
report, and still not be obliged to send an adverse action notice.9
GEICO is an example of an insurance company that
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.




186. See infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
187. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 615, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007) ("[A]ny person [who] takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer
that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report"
must provide the consumer with notice of the adverse action. (emphasis added)).
188. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2212.
189. See DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
[Vol. 12
2008] IDENTITYPROTECTIONAND CONSUMER CREDIT 293
successfully exploited this reading of the statute.' 90 GEICO's
policy was to use a consumer's credit score as just one "weighted
factor.., along with 14 others," such as age and accident history,' 9'
to select a rate at which the insurance policy was to be issued.' ,
GEICO did not determine the insurance rate until the fourteen
factors, only one of which was the consumer's credit score, were
analyzed.9
Under the multi-factor system, if an insurance company
charges the consumer a higher rate notwithstanding his credit
score, for a reason such as an extremely poor driving history, there
is no need for an adverse action notice.194 This suggests that the
duty to give an adverse action notice "arises from some practical
consequence of reading the report," and not just a "subsequent
adverse occurrence" that would have caused the higher rate
anyway.195
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the based on
provision indicates that insurance companies should continue to
structure their rate calculations around various factors, including a
consumer's credit report.196  The more factors that a company
considers, the less likely that the driver's poor credit history will be
the sole factor to negatively affect his insurance rates. 9' If the
company is able to point to some other factor besides credit
history to justify the higher rate, an adverse action notice will not
be necessary.198
C. "Willful"
1. An Amorphous Standard
Interestingly, the American Insurance Association
190. See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
191. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 435 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006).
192. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
193. See id.
194. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2212 n.13 (2007).
195. Reckless Conduct, supra note 145.
196. See supra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
197. See id.
198. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2212.
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"applauded the decision" in the Burr case.' 99 A statement issued
by one of the association's lawyers, Dave Snyder,2°° stated that
"'the [C]ourt's ruling provides guidance moving forward and
makes clear that good faith efforts by insurers to comply with the
law will not be punished as willful violations.' 201 The statement
went on to say that unfortunately the Burr "opinion may not do
much to stem the tide of consumer class action litigation" in light
of the adoption of an ambiguous standard for establishing willful
violation of FCRA.2 2 On the other hand, the now "high bar for
proving recklessness" makes various arguments available to assist
companies in defending against this type of lawsuit.2 3 Similarly,
because of the "high standard," corporate defense lawyers say they
will be "shocked [if] plaintiffs are going to be able to come up with
reckless conduct.
204
Actually, the ostensibly lower standard placed on "willfully
fail[ing] to comply" 205 with the FCRA was both helpful and
harmful for insurance companies. The Court interpreted "willfully
fail[ing] to comply ''2° as "reaching reckless . . . violations."20' 7
Recklessness requires that the plaintiff show "that the company
ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk
associated with a reading that was merely careless. ', 208 In other
words, recklessness is "an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is
either known or so obvious that it should be known., 20 9  The
standard is objectively assessed.210
199. Robert Mentzer, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 26, 2006, http://docket.medill.
northwestern.edu/archives/003889.php.
200. Dave Synder is assistant general counsel for the American Insurance
Association.
201. Mentzer, supra note 199.
202. Stephanie Sheridan & Kelly Savage, U.S. Supreme Court Interprets 'Willful'
Noncompliance (Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold LLP, San Francisco, Cal.), July
2007, http://www.sdma.com/Publications/detail.aspx?pub=4746.
203. Id.
204. Joyce E. Cutler, Credit Policy: Supreme Court's SAFECO Ruling Seen as
Affecting Credit Card Class Actions, 88 B.B.R. 1130 (June 25, 2007).
205. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681n(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007).
206. § 1681n(a).
207. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2007).
208. Id. at 2215.
209. Id.
210. See id. (stating that "there is no need to pinpoint the negligence/recklessness
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Although recklessness is technically a lower standard of
mens rea than knowing, the standard still requires a great deal of
interpretation. 21 Thus, the holding is burdensome for insurance
212companies. The Court did not define what constitutes a reckless
disregard of the FCRA, and "essentially punted," on this issue.213
The Court only stated that recklessness is "on the continuum
between intentional and negligent violations of the statutes.,
21 4
Because Safeco's conduct, in the Court's view, "[fell] well short,
21
1
of recklessness, the Court unfortunately failed to "pinpoint the
line between recklessness and negligence" 6 Therefore, there was
no imminent need for the Court to address this issue.217
A recklessness standard "makes it easier" for consumers to
allege a violation of § 1681n(a), which will increase the risk of
lawsuits filed by consumers.218 Further, the ability of a defendant
to "estimate accurately the risk of litigation" will be diminished
because of the "amorphous [recklessness] standard., 219  The
Financial Services Roundtable gave as an example a company that
made a good faith determination that it acted non-willfully in
regards to violating the statute.22 0  Before Burr, this company
would likely be willing to litigate the case.22' After Burr, however,
the company would be under "increased pressure to settle the
case" because of the ambiguity of the standard. In a case very
similar to Burr, the insurance companies settled a class action suit
223for $280 per person for a class of more than 67,000 members.
Plaintiffs never had to prove actual damages sustained by a class
line, for Safeco's reading of the statute, albeit erroneous, was not objectively
unreasonable.").
211. See Hopkins, supra note 97.
212. See id.
213. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
214. Id.
215. Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2216 (stating Safeco's actions "[fell] well short of raising
the 'unjustifiably high risk' of violating the statute necessary for reckless liability.").
216. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
217. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2215-6.





223. Id. at *22.
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member, yet the settlement totaled around $20 million.224
Both consumers and insurance companies are hoping for
more guidance from the federal banking regulators on "how to
treat" adverse actions and prescreened offers.225 The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has not provided any commentary on
the FCRA since 1990, but is "working on an update.,
226
Unfortunately, the FTC, although it has "enforcement
responsibility" over the FCRA, is the only one of "all the federal
agencies" that does not have "rulemaking authority., 22 Therefore,
it would be more useful for the Federal Reserve Board, or the
Office of Comptroller of the Currency to "issue interpretations
pursuant to that rulemaking authority., 22  According to Helen
Foster, a former FTC lawyer who briefly worked on the agency's
previous commentary, the rulemaking authorities need to "put out
guidance that would be more helpful to their regulated financial
institutions. 2 2 9 "The FTC guidance is very useful," she said, "but
what would be more useful would be for the bank agencies to also
opine.
, 210
2. Reliance on Legal Counsel
The reasonable objective standard231 leaves insurance
companies with many unanswered questions, as future litigants are
left "the task of propounding a formulation of the reckless
disregard standard., 23 2 This will require insurance companies to
consult the advice of legal counsel to avoid future violations.233
224. See Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 42, at *22 (citing Razilov v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV 01-1466 BR, 2006 WL 3312024, at *4 (D.Or. July
6,2006) (Stipulation of Settlement)).
225. See Hopkins, supra note 97.
226. Id. (according to Joel Winston, associate director of the agency's division of
privacy and identity protection).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. Helen Foster is an attorney at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2007). The Court
held that Safeco's reading "was not objectively unreasonable" although it was
"erroneous." Id.
232. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
233. See Hopkins, supra note 97.
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Advice of counsel, however, will only be relevant if a court
''cannot find that an insurer's refusal to send an adverse action
notice was objectively reckless based on judicial guidance and the
language of the statute. ''2 M Objective recklessness will therefore
be for the courts to decide .
The Court's silence on this matter still raises the issue of
"how unreasonable an insurer's interpretation of the FCRA must
be to rise to the level of a reckless disregard of the insurer's
duties., 236 The Court failed to address the Ninth Circuit's position
that "tenable, albeit erroneous, interpretation",131 may be in
reckless disregard of the FCRA, "even when those interpretations
are based on the advice of counsel. 23 8 The Court also did not rule
on whether a company's "good faith reliance on legal counsel"
would protect the company from liability for willful violation of
the FCRA.23' The Court "seemed to suggest," however, that it
would.24 Therefore, it will likely take another case to discern
whether or not companies may rely on legal counsel's
interpretation and avoid a willful failure to comply with §
1681n(a).2 1
The Burr holding has already affected pending lawsuits. 242
against credit and insurance companies. In both the Third and
the Ninth Circuit, two cases have been remanded for a further
determination of whether the defendant's conduct was
"reckless., 243 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Willes,, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit
to "reconsider" its reversal of the district court's finding that the
insurance company had willfully violated the FCRA.2" In
234. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 435 F.3d 1081, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006).
238. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
239. Sheridan & Savage, supra note 202.
240. Patrikis & Cuccinello, supra note 14.
241. See DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
242. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
243. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Willes, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007);
Whitfield v. Radian Guaranty Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20732 (3d Cir. 2007); see
also Supreme Court Vacates, Remands FCRA Claim in Wake of Safeco Ruling, 88
BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 25 (June 25, 2007) [hereinafter Vacates, Remands].
244. Vacates, Remands, supra note 243.
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Whitfield v. Radian Guaranty, Inc., the Third Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for the same reasons and asked the parties
to file briefs on "how the case might be affected" by the Burr
holding. 45
3. Consumer Remedies
The FCRA depends on consumer self-help for its
246enforcement. Often, the § 1681n(a) damages are the only
effective remedy against a reporting agency or company.247 The
reckless standard for a willful violation makes it easier for
248consumers to bring a class action lawsuit against these actors.
Burr has increased the likelihood that an adverse action notice
claim will be "brought and certified as a damages class action
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 249 In order
to bring a claim under the FCRA, a plaintiff need not establish any
actual damages as long as he alleges that the defendant "willfully"
violated the FCRA. °50 Consequently, a recklessness standard for a
willful violation makes it easier for consumers to bring such a
claim, as a plaintiff will only be required to show a reckless
disregard of the statute instead of an intentional violation.25' The
common defense of "'we didn't know"' is going to be "less useful
to the defendants now" that the Court has applied a reckless
standard. 2
It is unclear what effect Burr will have on the damages
awarded to plaintiffs in these cases. Currently, many laws
authorizing statutory damages, similar to the FCRA, also contain a
provision limiting the aggregate award to a class. 53 Congress has
245. Id. (citing Whitfield v. Radian Guaranty Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20732
(3rd Cir. 2007)).
246. See DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
247. See National Consumer Law Center, supra note 18, at *27-8 (stating that tort
claims are not effective because Congress has granted immunity to most agencies,
users and furnishers. Similarly, criminal liability is "virtually nonexistent").




252. Cutler, supra note 204.
253. See Joint Brief of Respondents, supra note 30, at *31.
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the ability to limit the availability of class actions under a federal
statute, but has not chosen to do so in the FCRA.2 4 It is possible,
however, that Congress will amend the FCRA to limit such
damages because of lawsuits like Burr. Also, the judge in the
class action suit has the power to limit damages considered to be
"unconstitutionally excessive." 6 After a class has been certified,
the judge may evaluate the defendant's conduct and limit its
257exposure.
There is evidence that judges have taken other measures to
protect defendants.258 For example, some judges have started to
251reject class certification in FCRA cases. U.S. District Judge John
F. Walter "refused" to certify a class action filed against Cost Plus,
Inc.260 "'In this case, if a class is certified and Plaintiff prevails,
even the minimum statutory damages would be ruinous to
Defendant,"' Walter said.26' If the plaintiff had been able to prove
a willful violation, the court said that the "statutory damages alone
would range from a minimum of $340 million to a maximum of
$3.4 billion. 2 62 A judgment in this amount would have bankrupted
the defendants, even though there was no evidence that the
plaintiffs in the case were actually harmed.263  Denial of class
certification, however, does not prevent potential plaintiffs who
have "suffered actual damages as a result of [the] Defendant's
conduct" from pursuing their individual cases.2 64
Insurance companies warn that the application of a reckless
standard will ultimately be disadvantageous for consumers.'
61
They claim that "'gigantic consumer class actions"' seeking
"damages for millions of transactions" will have "ruinous effect on
254. See id.
255. See id. at *32.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. See Cutler, supra note 204 (citing Spikings v. Cost Plus Inc., No. 2:06-cv-
08125, C.D. Cal. May 25, 2007); see also Joint Brief of Respondents, supra note 30, at
*32.






265. See Joint Brief of Respondents, supra note 30, at *29.
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small businesses in particular" and ultimately the costs will be
"paid by consumers."'2 66 If consumers will be charged more by
insurance companies as a result of the damages and legal fees
incurred in defense of their rates and policies, then perhaps the
267victory for consumers is a hollow one.
D. Consumer Protection Risks
The purpose of the FCRA is, among other things, to
268protect consumers. Consumer protection is at risk when
consumers are no longer alerted to potential problems with their
credit reports.269 Infrequent credit applicants may not even realize
that their credit is in jeopardy. 270 According to the National
Consumer Law Center, a "significant number" of Americans do
not apply for credit on an active basis.27' Many of these
individuals, however, periodically purchase insurance. 27' For these
consumers, the adverse action notice "may be the only alert they
ever receive that their credit profile is compromised.
'27 3
A low credit score could result from inaccurate reporting or
even identity theft.274 Because of the thief's ability to conceal ther 275
fraud, victims do not usually discover identity theft until fifteen
months after it has occurred; 76 at least twenty percent will not
277learn of the theft until two years later.
Information received by credit reporting agencies "almost
always shows early evidence of obvious errors and indicia of
266. Id. (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1979)).
267. See Gupta, supra note 164.
268. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 U.S. 2201 (2007); Fair Credit
Reporting Act § 603, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
269. See National Consumer Law Center, supra note 18, at *26.
270. See id. at *27.
271. See id.
272. Id.
273. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
274. See id; see also National Consumer Law Center, supra note 18, at *23 (stating
that identity theft occurs when "an imposter poses as someone else and applies for
and receives credit on the basis of another's good credit standing").
275. See National Consumer Law Center, supra note 18, at *23.
276. See id. at *24.
277. See id.
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fraud. 278  Failure by insurance companies to send consumers
adverse action notices would "completely eliminate" this early
warning system.2 9 The Burr holding, in effect, allows insurance
companies to send out fewer adverse action notices, which might
prevent early detection of some identity thefts.80
Informing consumers about the "inaccuracies in their credit
reports is the linchpin of the entire credit reporting regulatory
scheme embodied in the FCRA. Mistakes in a consumer's credit
report, "if corrected, would qualify the applicant for a more
favorable [insurance] rate., 282 Therefore, it is difficult to
"reconcile" the purpose of the FCRA with a holding that "relieves
insurers of their duty" to provide consumers with a notice that an
adverse action has been taken against them because of their credit
283report .
V. CONCLUSION
The Burr holding was both advantageous and
disadvantageous for the parties involved in the case: insurance
companies and consumers. 284 Burr identifies a loophole in the
FCRA, allowing companies to use a neutral rate as the baseline for
an increase .28 Therefore, insurance companies are required to
send out fewer adverse action notices than they would if the
baseline was the best possible rate.286  Moreover, insurance
companies can consult various aspects of a consumer's identity,suchas ae an driing 287
such as age and driving record. If these factors, exclusive of
credit score, result in an increased rate, no adverse action notice is
required.28 8 The Burr holding, however, is also disadvantageous to
insurance companies, as the "willful" standard is still vague and
278. Id.
279. Id. at *27-28.
280. See id. at *27.
281. DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See supra notes 163-282 and accompanying text.
285. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 U.S. 2201, 2213-14 (2007).
286. See id. at 2214.
287. See id. at 2212.
288. See id.
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will require companies to consult legal counsel in the course of
interpreting their conduct.289
Despite the lower standard of proof required for a willful
violation of the FCRA, the holding is most disadvantageous to
consumers.2 9 The holding requires only the minimal adverse
action notices to be distributed to consumers, even when identity
theft or errors in the report might jeopardize the consumer's credit
score.291  Nevertheless, with the still ambiguous standard of
"willful," the Burr holding increases the likelihood of future
litigation.292 Fortunately, the Burr holding has affirmed the right
of a consumer to bring a private action against a company that fails
to adhere to the ambiguous provisions of the FCRA.93
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289. See DiMugno & Quinn, supra note 10.
290. See id.
291. See National Consumer Law Center, supra note 18, at *27.
292. See Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 42, at *20.
293. See Burr, 127 S. Ct. at 2206.
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